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THE MEDICAL PRIVILEGE IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS-SHOULD IT MATTER WHETHER
YOUR EGO OR YOUR ELBOW HURTS?
Kenneth S. Broun *
The landmark case of Jaffee v. Redmond' set the parameters for
2
a medical privilege in the federal courts. Before Jaffee, some, but
not all, 3 federal courts recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege.
The law was clearer with regard to the non-existence of a general
physician-patient privilege-all of the federal courts, at least in
recent years,4 rejected such a privilege.5
* Henry Brandis Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School
of Law. Some significant parts of the research for this article were done in
connection with the author's work as a consultant to the Federal Rules of
Evidence Advisory Committee. This research was embodied in memoranda
prepared for committee. However, the views and opinions expressed in this
article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Advisory
Committee or any individual member of that committee. The author wishes to
thank Professor Daniel J. Capra for his reading and helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this article. The views and opinions expressed are the author's
and not necessarily Professor Capra's.
1. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
2. See, e.g., In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325, 1328-29 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding a
qualified psychotherapist-patient privilege exists); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632,
640 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding the privilege exists but does not apply to identity
or fact and time of treatment).
3. United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299, 1302 (10th Cir. 1994) (refusing
to recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege in a criminal child sexual
abuse case); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1989)
(finding no psychotherapist-patient privilege in a federal criminal case); United
States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562, 567 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding no physicianpatient or psychotherapist-patient privilege exists in federal criminal trials).
4. Professors Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth Graham take the position
that the federal authority rejecting the privilege is not totally clear. See 25
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH L. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5522, at 68 (1989).

5. See, e.g., Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Moore, 970 F.2d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Bercier, 848 F.2d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 1988); see also Post-Jaffee cases: Boddie
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After Jaffee, there is a psychotherapist-patient privilege in the
federal courts, and it is absolute. There is just as clearly no general
physician-patient privilege.
The Court in Jaffee recognized a psychotherapist-patient
privilege and afplied it to confidential communications to a licensed
social worker. The Court's rationale was utilitarian: the privilege
serves the public interest by facilitating the process of appropriate
treatment for individuals suffering from a mental or emotional
problem. 7 The Court noted:
Effective psychotherapy ... depends upon an atmosphere of
confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make
a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions,
memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the
problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists,
disclosure of confidential communications made during
counseling sessions may cause embarrassment or disgrace.
For this reason, the mere possibility of disclosure may
impede development of the confidential relationship
8
necessary for successful treatment.
The Court was careful to reject any notion that the privilege be
qualified by a balancing component: "Making the promise of
confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge's later evaluation of the
relative importance of the patient's interest in privacy and the
evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of
the privilege." 9
Communications to a psychotherapist were distinguished
from those made to a physician for physical ailments where
"[t]reatment . . . can often proceed successfully on the basis of a
physical examination, objective information supplied by the patient,
0
and the results of diagnostic tests."'
This article will explore whether the medical privilege in the
v. Cranson, No. 97-3247, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 8742 (6th Cir. May 4, 1999);

Martin v. Cottrell Contracting Corp., No. 7:00-CV-1 14-F(1), 2000 WL
33177232 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 13, 2000).
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 10.
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federal courts should be expanded beyond the psychotherapistpatient privilege to a broader, more general physician-patient
privilege such as that existing in more than forty states." It will
conclude that the Court's distinction between statements made for
the purpose of mental as opposed to physical ailments is not justified
and that a privilege, limited in scope to the communications covered
by the presently existing and relatively narrow psychotherapistpatient privilege, is justified. Such a privilege would be applicable in
relatively few cases, but its existence may be important in some
instances, and the policy that it symbolizes is significant for the
protection of basic privacy rights.
Part I of this article sets out the parameters of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege as it has developed in the federal
courts since the Jaffee case. Part II discusses the arguments for and
against a broader medical privilege. Part III discusses the impact that
a broader privilege would have had on existing cases. Finally, Part
IV proposes an extension of the privilege to cover the same kinds of
communications that are covered by the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.
I. THE PARAMETERS OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPISTPATIENT PRIVILEGE.

A. Rules ofReference: ProposedFederalRule 504 and
Uniform Rule ofEvidence 503
As originally drafted in 1969,12 revised in 1971,13 and sent to
Congress by the United States Supreme Court in 1972,14 the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence contained nine rules governing
specific privileges. Among those rules was Rule 504, governing
11. For a complete list of the states using a more general physician-patient
privilege, see infra note 160.
12. Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance-Testimonial
Privileges and the FederalRules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 772-79

(2002); FED. R. Evil. 5-01 to 5-13 (Preliminary Proposed Draft Mar. 1969), 46
F.R.D. 161, 243-84 (1969).
13. Broun, supra note 12 at 772; FED. R. EviD. 5-01 to 5-13 (Revised
Proposed Draft Mar. 1971), 51 F.R.D. 315, 356-83 (1971).
14. Broun, supra note 12 at 772; FED. R. EvID. 501-513 (Version
Promulgated by U.S. Supreme Court Nov. 20, 1972), 56 F.R.D. 183, 230-61
(1973).
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communications between psychotherapists and patients. 15 All of the
15. FED. R. EvID. 504 (Version Promulgated by U.S. Supreme Court Nov.
20, 1972), 56 F.R.D. 183, 240 (1973):
(a) Definitions.
(1) A "patient" is a person who consults or is examined or
interviewed by a psychotherapist.
(2) A "psychotherapist" is (A) a person authorized to practice
medicine in any state or nation or reasonably believed by the
patient so to be, while engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a
mental or emotional condition, including drug addiction, or (B) a
person licensed or certified as a psychologist under the laws of
any state or nation, while similarly engaged.
(3) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be
disclosed to third persons other than those present to further the
interest of the patient in the consultation, examination, or
interview, or persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of
the communication, or persons who are participating in the
diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist,
including members of the patient's family.
(b) General rule of privilege. A patient has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential
communications, made for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment of
his mental or emotional condition, including drug addiction, among
himself, his psychotherapist, or persons who are participating in the
diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist,
including members of the patient's family.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by
the patient, by his guardian or conservator, or by the personal
representative of a deceased patient. The person who was the
psychotherapist may claim the privilege but only on behalf of the
patient. His authority so to do is presumed in the absence of evidence
to the contrary.
(d) Exceptions.
(1) Proceedings for hospitalization. There is no privilege under
this rule for communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to
hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the psychotherapist in
the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that the
patient is in need of hospitalization.
(2) Examination by order of judge. If the judge orders an
examination of the mental or emotional condition of the patient,
communications made in the course thereof are not privileged
under this rule with respect to the particular purpose for which the
examination is ordered unless the judge orders otherwise.
(3) Condition an element of claim or defense. There is no
privilege under this rule as to communications relevant to an issue
of the mental or emotional condition of the patient in any
proceeding in which he relies upon the condition as an element of
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privilege rules, including Rule 504, were rejected by Congress in its
16
enactment of what are now the Federal Rules of Evidence and
replaced by Rule 501, providing that testimonial privileges in cases
applying federal law "shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
17
of
State rules
States in the light of reason and experience."'
law. '8
state
by
governed
cases
federal
all
control
to
privilege are
The controversy over the enactment of the Federal Rules of
19
Evidence centered largely on the privilege rules. Among the many
objections to the proposed rules was a strenuous objection to Rule
504 and its limitation of the medical privilege to communications
20
Many commentators
between psychotherapists and patients.
the privilege
recognize
to
rules
proposed
the
decried the failure of
that existed in a significant majority of the states protecting
21
communications between patients and physicians generally. In the
end, Congress decided to stay out of the controversy entirely and to
leave the development of the law of this privilege and all other
22
evidentiary privilege to the federal common law. Indeed, its fear of
his claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any
proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as an
element of his claim or defense.

16. NOTES OF COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 93-650, FED.
R. EviD. 501 app.
17. FED. R. EvID.501.

18. Id.

19. For discussions of the controversy in Congress over the privilege rules
see Broun, supra note 12 at 779; Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian
Approach to Privileges Under FederalRule of Evidence 501: The Restrictive
Thesis, the Expansive Antithesis, and the Contextual Synthesis, 73 NEB. L.

REv. 511, 517-23 (1994); Thomas G. Krattenmaker, InterpersonalTestimonial
Privileges Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach, 64
GEO. L.J. 613, 638-46 (1976).

20. See Broun, supra note 12 at 776.

21. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Marital and PhysicianPrivilegesA Reprint of a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DUKE L.J. 45, 49-51 (1975);
John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693, 694
(1974); Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Fed. Criminal
Laws of the Comm. on the JudiciaryHouse of Representatives, 93d Congress,
158, 160 (1973) (testimony of Charles R. Halpern and George T. Frampton, Jr.

on behalf of the Washington Council of Lawyers, Proposed Rules of

Evidence); Id. at 203-05 (testimony of George S. Leisure on behalf of the New
York Trial Lawyers Committee, Proposed Rules of Evidence).
22. Broun, supra note 12 at 769-70.
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venturing into the privilege morass was so great that Congress
specifically provided that enactment of privilege rules required
affirmative congressional action as opposed to the ordinary rule
making procedure. 23 The law of privilege would either have to be
developed on a case-by-case basis in the courts or by statute.
Despite the Congressional rejection of the draft rule governing a
psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Court in Jaffee referred to
Proposed Rule 504 as supportive of its decision.24 The Court noted
the statement of the Senate Judiciary committee that its action in
rejecting the proposed rules "'should not be understood as
disapproving any recognition of a psychiatrist-patient ...privileg[e]
contained in the [proposed] rules."' 25 Not surprisingly, the case law
following Jaffee has been largely consistent with Proposed Rule 504.
Following that rule can be a useful guideline in looking for the
parameters of the federal law on the issue.
Another general reference for a medical privilege is Uniform
Rule of Evidence 503 as last amended in 1999.26 This model rule is
based upon Proposed Federal Rule 504, but has been modified to
include the provision of an option that would apply the rule
to communications to physicians generally as well as to
psychotherapists or "mental health provider[s]. ' ' 27
The general state of the law governing the medical privilege in
the federal courts can be gleaned from the Proposed Federal Rule
504. There are, however, some important additional issues that have
been decided by the courts with regard to the privilege that provide
some gloss on the rule and that are especially significant in
considering the possible application of the privilege beyond
communications for treatment of mental conditions. The remainder
of this section deals with such issues.

23. Any "rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege"
must be approved by an Act of Congress. 28 U.S.C. 2074(b) (1994).
24. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 14-15.
25. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 13).
26. UNir. R. EvID. 503.

27. Id.
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B. The PrivilegeExtends to Notes and Records if They
Reflect Communications.
The Court in Jaffee referred to the need to protect "confidential
communications" and relied on the need for an "atmosphere of
confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank
28
and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories and fears."
Based on these considerations, the Court went on to protect the social
worker's notes as well as her recollection of the communications
from the patient. 29 In Jane Student 1 v. Williams,33° the court
included notes made by a psychotherapist in privilege
communications. In addition, the court protected information from
conversations between patient and psychotherapist where the notes
are prepared by someone other than the psychotherapist, "as long as
the third person's receipt of the information does not destroy
confidentiality and thus the privilege[]."31
C. Does the PrivilegeApply Beyond the Licensed
Psychotherapist?
Proposed Federal Rule 504(a)(2) defined psychotherapist as:
(A) a person authorized to practice medicine in any state or
nation, or reasonably believed by the patient so to be, while
engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or
emotional condition, including drug addiction, or (B) a
person licensed or certified as a psychologist under the laws
of any state or nation, while similarly engaged.32
Jaffee applied the privilege to a licensed social worker. 33 Based
on Jaffee and the Proposed Rule, communications to any licensed
mental health provider would clearly seem to be included within the
privilege. 34 It also seems clear that a physician, including a general
practitioner, would be covered by the privilege, providing that he or
she were dealing with a mental, as opposed to a physical health
issue.35 Not fully resolved by the federal courts is the extent to which
unlicensed persons providing mental health services are to be
28. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
29. See id. at 18.
30. 206 F.R.D. 306, 310 (S.D. Ala. 2002).

31. Id. at310.

32. FED. R. EVID. 504(a)(2) (Version Promulgated by U.S. Supreme Court
Nov. 20, 1972), 56 F.R.D. 183, 240 (1973).

664
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included in the privilege as established in Jaffee. The Court in Jaffee
used the term "licensed" in referring to the social worker to whom
the communications were made,3 6 but that was the only fact
scenario before the Court. Proposed Rule 504(a)(2) used the term
"authorized,, 3 7 language that is broad enough to include someone
who is authorized but unlicensed.
Some federal courts have applied the privilege to
communications to unlicensed persons.
In Oleszko v. State
3
8
Compensation Insurance Fund, the court applied the privilege to
unlicensed counselors employed by an Employee Assistance
Program ("EAP"). The court found an analogy to the licensed social
worker in Jaffee stating:
EAPs, like social workers, play an important role in
increasing access to mental health treatment .... Growing
numbers of EAPs help employees who would otherwise go
untreated to get assistance. The availability of mental
health treatment in the workplace helps to reduce the stigma
associated with mental health problems, thus encouraging
more people to seek treatment. EAPs also assist those who
could not otherwise afford psychotherapy by providing
39
and/or helping to obtain financial assistance.
The court went on to note that the EAPs in question worked as
part of a team with licensed psychologists or social workers. 4° It is,
therefore, possible that the court would have reached a different
conclusion if the EAPs' work had not been done in connection with
licensed persons.4 ' Nevertheless, the court's language, together with
33. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15.
34. UNIF. R. EvID. 503 provides an optional term "mental-health provider"
as the recipient of the privileged communications. Part (a)(2) defines "mentalhealth provider" as a "person authorized, in any State or country, or reasonably
believed by the patient to be authorized, to engage in the diagnosis or treatment
of a mental or emotional condition, including addiction to alcohol or drugs."
35. See, e.g., Finley v. Johnson Oil Co., 199 F.R.D. 301, 303 (S.D. Ind.
2001) (holding the privilege applies to communications to general practitioners
dealing with mental health issues).
36. 518 U.S. at 15.
37. 56 F.R.D. at 240.
38. 243 F.3d 1154, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 2001).
39. Id. at 1157-58.
40. Id. at 1158.
41. Id. Analogizing to statements made to agents of either the lawyer or the
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similar rulings in some District Court cases, 42 is broad enough to
suggest that the broader term "authorized" as used in Proposed Rule
504 may be the guiding principle.
At least one Court of Appeal has applied a less generous
definition of psychotherapist than did the court in Oleszko, although
under circumstances that are distinguishable. In United States v.
Schwensow,43 statements to Alcoholics Anonymous volunteer
telephone operators were not protected. The court noted that the
operators did not possess credentials that might qualify them as
"licensed." 44 In Schwensow, however, the court relied on other facts
that prevented the application of the privilege and might well have
prevented its application even if the operators had been fully
licensed.45 The operators did not identify themselves as therapists or
counselors.46 They did not confer with the defendant in a fashion
client in the context of the attorney-client privilege makes it likely that such
communications would be covered. See, e.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d
918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) (finding that attorney-client privilege extended to an
accountant hired by an attorney to aid the attorney in understanding the client's
financial situation); Winchester Capital Mgmt. Co. v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co.,
144 F.R.D. 170, 172 (D. Mass. 1992) (holding that privilege extended to
principal of corporate client where disclosure by attorney was reasonable and
necessary). Courts dealing with psychotherapist-patient privilege have also
had no problem extending the privilege to persons who are clearly agents of
the psychotherapist. See, e.g., Jane Student 1, 206 F.R.D. at 310 and supra
note 30. Furthermore, Proposed Rule 504(a)(3) provided that:
[a] communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to
third persons other than those present to further the interest of the
patient in the consultation, examination, or interview, or persons
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication, or
persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the
direction of the psychotherapist, including members of the patient's
family.
42. Greet v. Zagrocki, No. CIV. A. 96-2300, 1996 WL 724933, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 16, 1996) (privilege protects files with regard to police officer's
consultation with department's Employee Assistance Program. The
consultation was with regard to department's "in-house alcohol dependency
program."); United States v. Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97 (D. Mass. 1996)
(communications to unlicensed rape crisis counselor privileged. The victim
waived the privilege to a limited extent by agreeing to an in camera review of
records).
43. 151 F.3d 650, 657-58 (7th Cir. 1998).
44. Id. at 657.
45. Id. at 657-58.
46. Id. at 657.
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that in any way resembled a psychotherapy session. 47 There was no
indication that the AA office provided counseling service. 48 The
telephone calls in question were made for the purpose of finding out
the address of a detoxification center, not for help in coping with
alcoholism. 49 Finally, the court stated that the interactions did not
relate to diagnosis, treatment or counseling and "[u]nder no
circumstances [could] these communications be interpreted as
'confidential communications'
entitled to protection from
50
....
disclosure
One District Court has more specifically rejected the language in
Oleszko. In Jane Student 1 v. Williams,5 1 the court held that licensed
counselors were covered by the privilege, but unlicensed counselors
were not. The court specifically rejected the reasoning of Oleszko
based, in part, upon the language in Jaffee applying the privilege to
"licensed" social workers. 52 The court also believed that there
needed to be a brighter line for the boundaries of the privilege than
would exist if unlicensed mental health providers were included.53
The court noted that all but eight states recognizing a social
worker
54
licensed.
actually
persons
to
privilege
that
limit
privilege
In short, the federal law with regard to the application of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege to unlicensed persons is not settled.
This particular uncertainty is perhaps more significant with regard to
communications involving mental health than it would be if the
privilege were extended to cover general physician-patient
communications. There are simply more persons who may be
authorized but not licensed to provide mental counseling than
treatment for physical ailments. Nevertheless, if the privilege were
to be broadened into a wider physician-patient privilege, a
determination would have to be made as to whether the privilege
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.at 657-58.
50. Id. at 658.
51. 206 F.R.D. 306, 310 (S.D. Ala. 2002); see also supra note 30 and
accompanying text.
52. Jane Student], 206 F.R.D. at 310.
53. Id. at 309.
54. Id. at 310; see also Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790

(8th Cir. 1997) (holding there is no privilege for communications to company
ombudsman despite presumed confidentiality of such communications).
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would cover such individuals as physicians' assistants and company
nurses not operating under the direct supervision of a physician.
may be "licensed" but they are not licensed
Such persons
55
physicians.
D. The Communication Must Be in Confidence
Federal cases dealing with the psychotherapist privilege, both
before and after Jaffee, have insisted on circumstances supporting a
finding that the communications were in confidence. For example,
in In re Doe,56 the court did not reach a definitive conclusion as to
whether a psychotherapist-patient privilege existed. Instead, it held
that, even if such a privilege existed, it would not apply where there
were no communications of "the intensely personal nature that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is designed to protect from public
scrutiny." 57 In Doe, the communications were from seventy patients
58
a day who were seeking the dispensing of a controlled substance.
Similarly, In re Zuniga59 involved records from 60a
psychotherapist accused of defrauding Blue Cross-Blue Shield.
The court recognized the existence of the psychotherapist privilege
but refused to protect the patient's identity or the fact and time of his
treatment, stating:
In weighing these competing interests, the Court is
constrained to conclude that, under the facts of this case, the
balance tips in favor of disclosure. The essential element of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege is its assurance to the
patient that his innermost thoughts may be revealed without
fear of disclosure. Mere disclosure of the patient's identity
does not negate this element. Thus, the Court concludes
that, as a general rule, the identity of a patient or the fact
and time of his treatment does not fall within the scope of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.61
55. Again, the issue is clearer where the unlicensed person is an agent of

the psychotherapist or, in the case of a broadened privilege, of the physician.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
56. 711 F.2d 1187, 1193-94 (2dCir.1983).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1190.
59. 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983).
60. Id.
at 634.
61. Id. at 640; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated
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Post-Jaffee cases also hold that the identity of a patient or the
date of his or her treatment is not within the privilege. 62 Other issues
that have arisen after Jaffee in connection with the confidentiality of
communications involve instances in which a session with a
psychotherapist was mandatory and whether a report of the session
was to be made to someone other than the patient. Most of the cases
dealing with the issue have involved situations where, like Jaffee, a
police officer has been
ordered to undergo some kind of
63
evaluation.
psychological
Courts have usually held that the privilege still applies despite
the mandatory nature of the psychological evaluation. 64 Courts have
refused to apply the privilege where the police officer knew that
the
65
superiors.
her
or
his
to
reported
be
would
session
the
of
results
Jan. 30, 1986, 638 F. Supp. 794, 797-99 (D. Me. 1986) (citing Zuniga, the
court held that the psychotherapist privilege does not preclude disclosure of the
identity of a patient or the fact and time of the treatment).
62. See Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D. 306, 310 (N.D. Ill. 1999);
Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 230 (D. Mass. 1997); Hucko
v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526, 531 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Booker v. City of
Boston, Nos. 97-CV-12534-MEL, 97-CV-12675-MEL, 1999 WL 734644 (D.
Mass. Sept. 10, 1999).
63. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
64. See Speaker v. County of San Bernardino, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 111617 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that the fact that the session is mandatory does
not destroy the privilege where the patient is told by his employer that the
session would be confidential); Caver v. City of Trenton, 192 F.R.D. 154, 162
(D.N.J. 2000) (holding that the privilege applied where no confidential
information was disclosed by psychologist to police chief, but rather only a
"yes" or "no" as to whether the officer was fit to return to duty).
65. See Barrett v. Vojtas, 182 F.R.D. 177 (W.D. Pa. 1998). In Barrett,the

court held that the privilege did not apply where a police officer was ordered to
seek treatment and "more importantly" knew that the psychiatrist would report
back to the police department with regard to the examination. The officer
knew that a status report and recommendations would be made. The fact that
he thought communications themselves would be confidential did not make the
privilege applicable. Id.; see also Kamper v. Gray, 182 F.R.D. 597 (E.D. Mo.
1998) (refusing to apply the privilege when a police officer knew that the
results of an evaluation would be reported to his superiors. In contrast, with
regard to another police officer, a voluntary professional counseling session
was held to be protected); Scott v. Edinburg, 101 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1020 (N.D.
Ill. 2000) (holding no privilege existed where the police officer knew that
psychological testing results would be reviewed by the police chief); Siegel v.
Abbottstown Borough, No. Civ. 1:03-CV-0549, 2004 WL 230892, at *4 (M.D.
Pa. Jan. 30, 2004) (holding no privilege existed where patient knew report
would be transmitted to others).
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E. The Privilege is Absolute

The Court in Jaffee emphasized the absolute nature of the
privilege incorporated in Proposed
psychotherapist privilege. 66 The
67
absolute.
likewise
was
504
Rule
Nevertheless, a few district court cases after Jaffee have held
that the privilege must be qualified where the defendant seeks
information otherwise within the privilege to assist in making out a
defense in a criminal case. 68 In United States v. Alperin,69 the
defendant sought the psychiatric records of the assault victim in
support of the defendant's self-defense claim. The court applied the
federal privilege announced in Jaffee,7 0 but stated that the need for
confidentiality had to be balanced against the defendant's Sixth
71
Amendment rights to a fair trial and to confront witnesses.
Although the court applied the privilege in a case governed by
federal law, it looked to California cases that had balanced the
privilege against the rights of an accused in a criminal case. 72 The
records to
court ordered an in camera review of the psychiatric
73
determine the value of the evidence to the defendant.
In United States v. Hansen,74 the court dealt with a request for
psychiatric records of a now-deceased victim. The court held that
the psychiatrist could assert the privilege on behalf of the deceased
patient, but it nevertheless ordered production of the records, stating:
The holder of the privilege has little private interest in
preventing disclosure, because he is dead. The public does
66. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17. Some earlier federal court precedent had
described a qualified psychotherapist-patient privilege. See, e.g., In re Doe,
964 F.2d 1325, 1328 (2d Cir. 1992).
67. FED. R. EvID. 504(c) (Version Promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court
Nov. 20, 1972), 56 F.R.D. 183, 240 (1973).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Alperin, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (N.D. Cal.
2001); United States v. Hansen, 955 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Mont. 1997); United
States v. Haworth, 168 F.R.D. 660 (D. N.M. 1996).
69. 128 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
70. Id. at 1252.
71. Id. at 1253.
72. Id. at 1253-54.
73. Id. at 1255; see also United States v. Mazzola, 217 F.R.D. 84, 88 (D.
Mass. 2003) (holding that the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege did not
prevent disclosure to defense of therapist records of important government
witness in a criminal prosecution).
74. 955 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Mont. 1997).
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have an interest in preventing disclosure, since persons in
need of therapy may be less likely to seek help if they fear
their most personal thoughts will be revealed, even after
their death ....

However, I find that the defendant's need

75
for the privileged material outweighs this interest.
In United States v. Haworth,76 the court recognized the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to information relevant to his
defense, but nevertheless held that there was no right to examine
records that were privileged under the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. 77 The defendant would be permitted
to cross-examine the
78
patient regarding his treatment, however.
On the other side of the ledger, the court in United States v.
Doyle79 held that defendant's Sixth Amendment rights did not trump
the confidentiality of a victim's statements to a psychotherapist in
the context of a sentencing hearing. 80 Whatever impact Sixth
Amendment considerations have on the psychotherapist-patient
privilege would also apply to a broader physician-patient privilege.

F. The Privilege is Waived When the PatientRelies Upon the
Condition as an Element of a Claim or Defense in Any Legal Action
There are many federal cases, almost all from the district courts,
dealing with whether a party has waived the psychotherapist
privilege by asserting a claim of emotional distress or similar
damage. 8 ' A clear majority of the cases favor the rule that a party
82
waives the privilege by making a claim for emotional damages.
The cases following this majority rule are divided into those that find
that a mere claim in a pleading is sufficient for there to be a waiver
(referred to below as the "broad" rule) 83 and those that require some
indication that the plaintiff will offer some form of expert testimony

75. Id. at 1226 (citations omitted). The court did not elaborate as to
whether it would have reached a different result had the patient still been alive.
76. 168 F.R.D. 660 (D.N.M. 1996).
77. Id. at 661-62.

78. Id. at 662.
79. 1 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (D. Or. 1998).
80. Id. at 1190.
81. See infra Parts I.F.1-3.
82. See id.
83. See infra Part I.F.1.
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on the issue (referred to below as the "in-between" rule).84 A
minority of cases hold that a plaintiff does not waive the privilege
unless he or she introduces the testimony of the psychotherapist to
about those
whom the confidential statements were made or testifies
85
rule).
"narrow"
the
as
below
to
(referred
statements
1. The Broad Rule
Several courts have held that the mere pleading of emotional
distress is sufficient to waive the privilege. 86 The court's opinion in
Sarko v. Penn-DelDirectory Co., 7 is illustrative of the reasoning of
courts taking this position. In Sarko, the court gave three basic
reasons for finding waiver. First, it relied on pre-Jaffee decisions
that had found waiver. 88 Secondly, it noted that the Jaffee decision
had analogized the policy considerations supporting the
psychotherapist privilege to those supporting the attorney-client
privilege and that the latter privilege is waived when the advice of
counsel is in issue. 89 Lastly, quoting from Premack v. J.C.J.

84. See infra Part I.F.2.
85. See infra Part I.F.3.
86. E.g., Lanning v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., Nos. CIV. A. 97-593, CIV. A.
97-1161, 1997 WL 597,905, at *2-*3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1997); EEOC v.
Danka Indus., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1138, 1141-42 (E.D. Mo. 1997); Sidor v.
Reno, No. 95 CIV. 9588(KMW), 1998 WL 164,823 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1998).
In Sidor, the plaintiff not only sought damages for emotional distress but
challenged the decision of her employer to terminate her on the grounds that
she was dangerous to herself and to others. Id. at *1; see also Kirchner v.
Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), 184 F.R.D. 124, 128-29 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (ruling
plaintiff waived the privilege by raising the issue of her emotional condition
under both case precedent and Tennessee's psychiatrist-patient privilege
statute); Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562, 563, 568 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
(reversing magistrate judge's opinion adopting the narrow view of privilege
and adopting the broad view); Sanchez v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 131,
136 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding that plaintiff waived the privilege by putting his
emotional state at issue because of the strong need to allow defendant to
establish a defense); Dixon v. City of Lawton, Okla., 898 F.2d 1443, 1451
(10th Cir. 1990) (holding in a pre-Jaffee case that, even if plaintiff had not
raised the mental condition, the privilege would have been waived as
pertaining to the defense).
87. 170 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
88. Id. at 130. The court cites Topol v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 160 F.R.D.
476, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Price v. County of San Diego, 165 F.R.D. 614, 622
(S.D. Cal. 1996); Sarko, 170 F.R.D. at 130.
89. Sarko, 170 F.R.D. at 130.
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Ogar, Inc.,90 the court stated: "we agree that allowing a plaintiff 'to
hide.., behind a claim of privilege when that condition is placed
directly at issue in a case would simply be contrary to the most basic
sense of fairness and justice.'91
2. The In-Between Rule
Several courts have held that a party waives the privilege, not
simply by filing a pleading claiming emotional distress, but by
designating an expert to testify on that issue even though the expert
was not the psychotherapist involved in the confidential
communications.
Illustrative of this approach is a case from the Northern District
of Illinois, Santelli v. Electro-Motive.92 In Santelli, the court rejected
both a bright line broad and a bright line narrow test.9 3 It specifically
rejected the holding in Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark,94 the leading
case setting forth the narrow approach, that the privilege is waived
only by introducing evidence of the communication or by calling the
particular psychotherapist as a witness. 95 The court expressed
concern that this narrow view would permit the plaintiff to call a
non-treating psychotherapist and prevent cross-examination based
upon what she had told her treating psychotherapist. 96 The court
said, however, that the mere assertion of a claim for emotional
distress was not sufficient. 97 In Santelli, the plaintiff had expressly

limited her claim to negative emotions she suffered from the alleged
sex discrimination and retaliation and indicated she would forego
introducing evidence about emotional distress that necessitated care
or treatment by a physician. 98 Describing its view of the application
of the waiver rule in this instance, the court stated, "[w]hile we
believe that a party waives her psychotherapist-patient privilege by
electing to inject into a case either the fact of her treatment or any
90. 148 F.R.D. 140, 144-45 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
91. Sarko, 170 F.R.D. at 130 (alteration in original).
92. 188 F.R.D. 306 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
93. Id. at 308-09.
94. 174 F.R.D. 225, 229 (D. Mass. 1997). For a discussion of the
Vanderbilt case, see infra notes 107-115 and accompanying text.
95. Santelli, 188 F.R.D. at 308-09.

96. Id. at 308.
97. Id. at 309.
98. Id.
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that she may have experienced, Santelli is
symptoms or conditions
99
doing neither."
Another significant case taking this "in-between" view is
Speaker v. County of San Bernardino.100 Speaker involved a claim
against a law enforcement officer who had shot and killed the
plaintiffs family member. 1 1 The court held that the defendant
police officer waived his privilege as to the question of perception
distortion "by testifying that his perception of the incident was
distorted, and submitting the report of an expert that the distortion
resulted from the trauma of the incident."' 1 2 The court found no
waiver with regard to other aspects of the defendant's consultation
with a psychotherapist, however. 0 3 The court discussed both the
broad and narrow views of the privilege but stated that it would have
reached the same result under either rule. 104 The court held that the
patient, whether appearing as the plaintiff or defendant, must actually
05
make his or her condition an issue in order to waive the privilege.1
Several other district court cases take a similar approach to the
issue. 106
99. Id.
100. 82 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1118-20 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
101. Id.
at 1107.
at 1118.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1118-20.
104. Id.
105. Id.
at 1120.
106. See Allen v. Cook County Sheriff's Dep't, No. 97C3625, 1999 WL
168466, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 1999) (finding that merely seeking damages
for emotional distress does not waive the privilege; the plaintiff would waive

privilege if she put her mental condition at issue by disclosing that she
intended to call her psychotherapists or another expert to establish her claim);
Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (finding no
waiver where the plaintiff merely asserted a claim for emotional distress;
distinguishes cases where the plaintiff has offered or indicated any intent to
offer prior consultation with psychiatrist in order to support claims). The court

in Hucko found waiver based upon the plaintiff's assertion that the statute of
limitations should be tolled because he was preoccupied with treatment and
medications. Id. at 531-32; see also Adams v. Ardcor, 196 F.R.D. 339, 344
(E.D. Wis. 2000) (following Santelli and Hucko in finding that the mere
inclusion of a request for damages based on emotional distress does not waive
the privilege, but naming a psychologist as an expert witness waived the
privilege as to other consultations with psychotherapists); Noggle v. Marshall,
706 F.2d 1408, 1415 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding in a pre-Jaffee case that the
"privilege was waived not merely by [the defendant's] plea of insanity but by
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3. The Narrow Rule
The leading case setting forth the narrow view of waiver is
Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark.10 7 In Vanderbilt, the plaintiff
sought damages for gender discrimination, claiming emotional
distress. 10 8 The court disagreed with the broad view of waiver as set
forth in the Sarko case. 10 9 Unlike the court in Sarko, the court in
Vanderbilt rejected any argument based on pre-Jaffee decisions,
noting that the Court in Jaffee had made a point of rejecting any0
balancing in connection with the psychotherapist-patient privilege."
The court equated a finding of waiver of the privilege because the
evidence is relevant to a claim made by the patient with the sort of
balancing, or qualified privilege, rejected in Jaffee."' Secondly, in
Sarko, the court had analogized the situation to waivers under the
attorney-client privilege where there is waiver if the client relies on
the advice of counsel.1 2 The court in Vanderbilt argued that the case
before it was not based on the advice of the psychotherapist but was
rather more like a suit for attorney's fees where, the court said, there
is no waiver.11 3 Third, the court in Sarko had based its holding in
part on the fairness of permitting the opposing party to introduce the
communications with the psychotherapist where the patient relies on
his emotional condition as an element of his claim or as a basis for
damages."14 The court in Vanderbilt rejected the Sarko analysis in
this regard, finding that waiver would be justified only if the plaintiff
were to introduce the substance of the conversations with the
psychotherapist. 115
the defense putting medical experts on the stand who testified that he was

insane.").
107. 174 F.R.D. 225, 227-30 (D. Mass. 1997).
108. Id. at 226.
109. Id. at 228-30. For a discussion of Sarko, see supra notes 87-91 and
accompanying text.
110. Id. at 228-29. For a discussion of Jaffee's holding, see supra notes 610 and accompanying text.
111. Id. at 229.
112. Id.
113. Id. The court's statement with regard to the nonwaiver of the attorneyclient privilege in a case involving fees is not in accord with the general law
governing that privilege. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 133(a) (1996).

114. Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 229-30.
115. Id. at 230. Other cases taking the narrow view include: Fitzgerald v.
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One cannot predict where the federal courts will go with regard
to the waiver of the privilege in cases where the patient's mental
condition is in issue. The weight of authority would favor either the
broad or the in-between rule. In any event, the existence of some
significant limitation on the privilege in cases in which the patient's
condition is in issue would certainly operate as a significant check on
the application of any broader physician-patient privilege.
G. The Crime-FraudException
Proposed Federal Rule 504 did not contain a crime-fraud
exception. 116 Although the matter has apparently arisen infrequently
in the federal courts, however, at least one Court of Appeals has
found the existence of such an exception. " 7
In In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory P. Violette)," 8 the
defendant was charged with presenting trumped up disabilities for
the purpose of obtaining credit disability insurance payments." 9 The
government sought information through grand jury subpoenas from
120
the defendant's psychiatrists; the defendant claimed privilege.
The lower court had found the Jaffee privilege to be inapplicable
because the defendant did not have a bona fide therapeutic purpose
in consulting the psychiatrists.121 While not necessarily disagreeing
with that analysis, the Court of Appeals preferred to deal with the
situation as one in which the privilege as articulated in Jaffee
applied, but where an exception for statements made for the purpose
of facilitating a criminal act came into play. 122 The court used
23
precedent involving the attorney-client privilege to reach its result,'
Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 638-40 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Booker v. City of Boston,
Nos. 97-CV-12534-MEL, 97-CV-12675-MEL, 1999 WL 734644, at * 1 (D.
Mass. Sept. 10, 1999) (privilege not waived unless the plaintiff makes positive
use of the privileged material); see also Ellen E. McDonnell, Note, Certainty

Thwarted: Broad Waiver Versus Narrow Waiver of the Psychotherapist-

PatientPrivilegeafter Jaffee v. Redmond, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1369 (2001).
116. FED. R. EvlD. 504 (Version Promulgated by U.S. Supreme Court Nov.
20, 1972), 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-41 (1973).
117. UNIF. R. EvID. 504(d)(4) provides for a crime-fraud exception.
118. 183 F.3d71 (lstCir. 1999).
119. Id. at72.
120. Id. at 73.
121. Id. at 73-74.
122. Id. at 74-78.
123. Id. at 75.
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especially United States v. Jacobs,124 a Second Circuit case. The
court described the exception to the attorney-client privilege as
applying in cases such as Jacobs when "the client was engaged in (or
was planning) criminal or fraudulent activity when the attorneyclient communications took place... [and] the communications
were intended by the client to facilitate or conceal the criminal
activity."'' 25 The court applied the same policy to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, stating that the mental health
benefits of protecting such communications "pale in comparison to
'the normally predominant principal of utilizing all rational means
for ascertaining truth."",126 The court stated that the exception applies
"when communications are intended directly to advance a particular
criminal or fraudulent endeavor ...."127 The court found that the
evidence in Violette, consisting of the government agent's affidavit
establishing that the defendant was engaged in illegal and fraudulent
conduct and that he obtained assistance from the psychiatrists, was
sufficient for the exception to be invoked. 128 The court noted that the
exception applied even though the doctors
may have been "unwitting
29
pawns" in the defendant's scheme. 1
The crime-fraud privilege is a significant limitation on the
attorney-client privilege. 130 Although the matter predictably has
come up far less frequently in connection with the psychotherapistpatient privilege, the recognition of the exception in cases such as
Violette serves notice that it is probably an important limitation on
that privilege as well. It would be equally significant if the privilege
were expanded to cover communications of physical ailments as
well.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

117 F.3d 82, 87-89 (2d Cir. 1997).
Violette, 183 F.3d at 75.
Id. at 77 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 78-79.
For an extensive discussion of the crime-fraud exception in various

texts, see EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 6.13.2(d) (2002); JOHN W. STRONG ET
AL., 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §95 (5th ed. 1999).
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H. The PrivilegeMay Be Subject to an Exception Where the
Patienthas Expressed an Intention to Engage in Conduct
Likely to Result in Imminent Death or Serious Bodily
Injury to the Patientor Another Individual

Although less likely to arise in instances where the
communication involves physical as opposed to mental diagnoses, it
is nevertheless important to note the possibility of an exception to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege where the patient has expressed an
intent to engage in conduct likely to result in imminent death or
serious bodily injury to the patient or another individual. 13 1 For
example, the issue could arise in psychotherapist-patient cases where
the patient has conveyed a threat of suicide to his or her
psychotherapist. The same issue could also arise with regard to a
terminally ill patient's suicidal threats conveyed to her internist or
oncologist.
The primary support for this exception to the psychotherapistpatient privilege is contained in a footnote to the Jaffee case, where
the Court wrote:
Although it would be premature to speculate about most
future developments in the federal psychotherapist
privilege, we do not doubt that there are situations in which
the privilege must give way, for example, if a serious threat
of harm to the patient or to others can32be averted only by
means of a disclosure by the therapist.'
Although Proposed Federal Rule 504 contained no such
exception, 133 at least one circuit has recognized its existence. hi
131. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18, n.19.
132. Id. See generally, George C. Harris, The DangerousPatient Exception
to the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege: The Tarasoff Duty and the Jaffee
Footnote, 74 WASH. L. REv. 33 (1999).
133. FED. R. EvlD. 504 (Revised Proposed Draft Mar. 1971), 51 F.R.D. 315,
366-67 (1971). Uniform Rule of Evidence 503(d)(5) does contain such an
exception: "(d) There is no privilege under this rule for a communication: ...
(5) that the patient intends to kill or seriously injure the patient or another
individual." A few states have codified such an exception to the privilege. See
CAL. EviD. CODE § 1024, p. 192 (1995) ("There is no privilege under this
article if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is
in such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the
person or property of another and that disclosure of the communication is
necessary to prevent the threatened danger."); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. §
456-59 (West 2001).
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United States v. Glass,134 the defendant had expressed a threat to his
psychotherapist to kill President Clinton and his wife. 135 The court,
noting the Jaffee footnote, stated that it would recognize the
existence of an exception to the privilege that would apply to a threat
that was serious when uttered and where disclosure was the only
means of averting harm.' 36 The case was remanded for a review of
37
the seriousness of the threat.'
Two circuits, the Ninth and the Sixth, have rejected the
existence of a "dangerous patient" exception when it was raised in a
criminal trial after the threat had ceased to exist.' 38 In United States
v. Hayes, 139 the court dealt with threats to federal officers and a claim
of privilege based upon the psychotherapist-patient privilege.140 The
court distinguished between the ethical duty of a psychotherapist to
disclose threats to prevent harm to others and a required disclosure at
a court hearing after the threat had passed. 14 1 The court found the
footnote in Jaffee to relate to the former situation, but not the
latter. 142
The strong dissent in Hayes states that once the
psychotherapist has informed the patient of the need to disclose
threats for the protection of others, the privilege no longer
attaches. 143
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reached the same result in
United States v. Chase.144 In Chase, the psychiatrist had informed
the FBI of threats made by the defendant, her patient, against FBI
agents. 145 The court noted that the psychiatrist was acting in
accordance with state law that permitted her to deviate from the
confidentiality required of psychotherapists for the protection of third
parties. 146 Justifying disclosure of confidences is not the same as
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1357.
Id. at 1360.
Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000); United

States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
139. 227 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000).
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 580-81.
Id. at 583-84.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 588 (Bogg, J., dissenting).
340 F.3d 978.
Id. at 980.
Id. at 984-85.
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requiring the psychotherapist to testify in court once the danger has
passed, however. 147 Based primarily on this reasoning, 148 the court,
as did the Sixth Circuit in Hayes,14 9 rejected a "dangerous patient"

in a criminal case
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege
15 0
exist.
to
ceased
had
threat
occurring after the
I. Conclusion

Too short of a time has passed since the affirmation of a
psychotherapist-patient privilege in Jaffee to expect the full
parameters of the privilege to be fully entrenched. Yet, particularly
with the use of Proposed Federal Rule 504 as a guideline, the
dimensions of the privilege are fairly well established. Looking at
the way in which the psychotherapist-patient privilege has developed
may be useful in determining whether there should be a general
physician-patient privilege as well as the precise parameters of that
privilege.

147. Id.
148. The court in Chase articulated other reasons for rejecting the exception
including: 1) the absence of such an exception in most state privilege laws, id.
at 985-86; 2) the differing standards in each state for breach of confidentiality
would make the application of an exception to the federal privilege
impractical, id. at 986-89; 3) the absence of such an exception in Proposed
Federal Rule of Evidence 504, id. at 989-90; 4) several public policy
considerations including the court's belief that "a patient will retain
significantly greater residual trust when the therapist can disclose only for
protective, rather than punitive, purposes." Id. at 990. Despite finding the
existence of the privilege and the absence of the exception, the court refused to
reverse, finding the error to be harmless. Id. at 992-93.
149. The concurring opinion in Chase, signed by three judges of the en banc

court, would have adopted the exception based in large measure on the
footnote in Jaffee cited in the text accompanying supra note 132. Id. at 996.
The concurring judges also based their acceptance of the exception and
rejection of the majority opinion at least in part on the argument that once
disclosure is made "the patient has lost the medical benefit of being able to
speak to his psychotherapist in confidence that what he says will remain
secret." Id. at 996-97 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 992.
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II. THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST A GENERAL PHYSICIANPATIENT PRIVILEGE

A. The Trouble With Jaffee
The Court in Jaffee, by dictum, firmly rejected a general
physician-patient privilege, distinguishing statements made to
psychotherapists from those made to physicians for physical ailments
where treatment can often proceed on the basis of physical
15 1
examination, objective information and results of diagnostic tests.
The Court's rejection of a general physician-patient privilege
was consistent with holdings throughout the federal system prior to
Jaffee. 152 Not surprisingly, no federal court has recognized such a
53
privilege since Jaffee. 1
Although the Court's decision rejecting a general physicianpatient privilege is arguably sound, its rationale is suspect in at least
two respects. First, the Court's distinction between statements made
for purposes of diagnosis or treatment of physical, as opposed to
mental or emotional, problems does not withstand close or even not
so close scrutiny. 154 The medical literature is replete with statements
151. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10. See supranote 10 and accompanying text.
152. Examples of cases rejecting a general physician-patient privilege are
Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Moore, 970 F.2d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1992); and United States v. Bercier,848 F.2d
917, 920 (8th Cir. 1988).
153. In light of the clear precedent rejecting the existence of the privilege,
few cases spend much time on the issue. Examples of the many cases in which
courts have specifically noted the absence of such a federal privilege include
N. W Mem 7'. Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2004); United
States v. La. Clinic, No. CIV. A. 99-1767, 2002 WL 31819130, at *2 (E.D. La.
Dec. 12, 2002); and In re GrandJury Subpoena, 197 F. Supp. 2d 512, 513-14
(E.D. Va. 2002).
154. The Court in Jaffee was not alone in distinguishing between
communications with regard to physical concerns and those involving mental
problems. In Wei v. Bodner, the court stated:
The relationship between a psychotherapist and her patient is
substantially different from that between a doctor and her patient.
Patients must confide their most intimate dreams, hopes, fears, and
other personal information to their therapists. Without full disclosure
there is little hope that the therapy can be successful. While there are
other medical situations in which confidentiality may be equally
important, courts have recognized the special relationships that
psychotherapists have with their patients in according these
communications legal confidentiality in some situations.
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concerning the need for physicians to communicate with their
55
patients and the importance of adequate information from patients.1
The Ethics Manual of the American College of Physicians states, "At
the beginning of a patient-physician relationship, the physician must
understand the satient's complaints, underlying feelings, goals, and
expectations."
One does not have to have medical training to understand that a
physician must rely on the patient's statements of past medical
history, recent symptoms and subjective feelings, e.g., pain. If a
police officer, as in the Jaffee case, saw a general physician to treat,
for example, back pain, the physician, like the psychotherapist, might
have good reason to inquire as to incidents that might have caused
stress in her life. And the police officer might be reluctant to fully
discuss such incidents unless there was an assurance of privilege in a
subsequent court proceeding.
In addition to distinguishing statements with regard to physical
ailments from those involving mental illness, the Court in Jaffee, in
adopting the psychotherapist-patient privilege, relied heavily on the
fact that such a privilege existed in all fifty states. The Court stated:
That it is appropriate for the federal courts to recognize a
psychotherapist privilege under Rule 501 is confirmed by
the fact that all 50 States and the District of Columbia have
enacted into law some form of psychotherapist privilege.
We have previously observed that the policy decisions of
the States bear on the question whether federal courts
should recognize a new privilege or amend the coverage of
an existing one. Because state legislatures are fully aware
of the need to protect the integrity of the factfinding
functions of their courts, the existence of a consensus
127 F.R.D. 91, 97 (D. N.J. 1989) (citation omitted).

155. See Mi Young Hwang, How to Talk with Your Doctor, 282 J. AM. MED.
Dec. 22/29, 1999, at 2422 (recommending that patients be prepared to

Ass'N,

be "completely honest about [their] lifestyle, including ... diet, use of alcohol
or other drugs, smoking history, sexual history, and other health care [they]
receive."); Zelda Di Blasi et al., Influence of Context Effects on Health
Outcomes: A Systematic Review, 357 THE LANCET Mar. 10, 2001, at 757
(emphasizing the need for emotional as well as physical care in the treatment

of physical ailments).
156. American College of Physicians, ETHICS MANUAL, (4th ed.
www.acponline.org/ethics/ethicman.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).

1998),
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among the States indicates that "reason and experience"
support recognition of the privilege. In addition, given the
importance of the patient's understanding that her
communications with her therapist will not be publicly
disclosed, any State's promise of confidentiality would have
little value if the patient were aware that the privilege would
not be honored in a federal court. Denial of the federal
privilege therefore would frustrate the purposes of the state
legislation that was enacted to foster these confidential
1 57
communications.
In reaching its decision in Jaffee, the Court set forth a privilege
that applied not only to licensed psychologists and psychiatrists but
to licensed social workers as well. 158 The Court noted that all but
five states aplied their psychotherapist privilege to such
professionals. 15
That significant majority of states could apply equally in the
case of a general physician-patient privilege. Forty-one states, the
District of Columbia, and several United States territories have such
a privilege. 16 Furthermore, all but North Carolina and Virginia
provide for an absolute privilege. 16 1 Accordingly, the percentage of
states' laws protecting such communications is extremely close to
those involving communications to licensed social workers.
Thus, the fact that the Court's dicta in Jaffee rejected a general
physician-patient privilege is, at least, suspect. Whether such
suspicion justifies the adoption of such a privilege is, of course,
another question.
B. Legal Scholarship

1. Scholarship opposed to a general physicianpatient privilege
Many of the great evidence scholars of the past expressed an
opinion with regard to a general physician-patient privilege. Up to
the time of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, there was
virtually unanimous scholarly agreement that the protection of
communications between physicians and their patients was not
sufficiently important either to the freedom of communication
157. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12-13 (citation and footnotes omitted).
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the
between patient and physician, or to society as a whole, to justify
162
process.
judicial
the
to
information
valuable
of
potential loss
In large measure, a scholar's receptivity to the privilege
depended upon his or her view of the theory of the privilege:
utilitarian, protective of the right of privacy, or otherwise. John
Henry Wigmore, the nation's most revered evidence scholar, took a
purely utilitarian view of privileges generally. He set forth four
widely cited "canons," which he said every privilege must satisfy:
1) The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed.
2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties.
3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
158. Id. at 15.
159. Id. at 16-17, n.17.
160. ALASKA R. EvID. 504; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2235 (West 2003);
ARK. R. EvID. 503; CAL. EVID. CODE

§ 994 (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. §

13-90-107(d) (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-1460 (West Supp. 2004);

DEL. R. EvID. 503; D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-307 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-940 (2003); GUAM. R. EvID. § 503(f); HAW. R. EvID. 504; IDAHO R. EVID. 503;
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-802 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-31 (Michie 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10(3)(c) (West 1999); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-427 (1994); LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 510 (West Supp. 2004); ME.
R. EvID. 503; MICH. COMP. LAWS. SERV. § 600.2157 (LEXIS 2004); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 595.02(d) (West 2000); MIss. R. EvID. 503; Mo. ANN. STAT. §
491.060(5) (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-805 (West 2003); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-504 (Michie 1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.21549.245 (LEXIS 2002 & Supp. 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:26 (2003);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.2 (West 1994); N.M. R. EvID. 11-504; N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 4504 (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (2003); N.D. R.
EvID. 503; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(B)(1) (Anderson 2001); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2503 (West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.235 (2003); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5929 (West 2000); P.R. R. EvD. 26; S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 19-13-7 (Michie 1995); TEX. R. EvID. 509; UTAH R. EvID. 506; VT.
R. EvID. 503; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-399 (LEXIS 2000); 5 V.I. CODE ANN. §
855 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(a)(4) (West 1995); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 905.04 (West 2000); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(i) (LEXIS

2003).
161.

See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (2003); VA. CODE. ANN. § 8.01-399

(LEXIS 2000). New Hampshire interpreted its statute to grant a qualified
privilege. See State v. Elwell, 567 A.2d 1002, 1006 (N.H. 1989).
162. CLINTON DEWITT, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN
PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT 32-33 (1958).
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community ought to be sedulouslyfostered.
4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communications must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
1 63
litigation.
Wigrnore believed that the physician-patient privilege only met
the third of these canons.'164 He argued that in only a few instancesvenereal disease and criminal abortion--did the patient attempt to
reserve any secrecy. 165 Most of a patient's ailments are immediately
disclosed and discussed. 166 Although Wigmore offered no empirical
data to support his assumptions, he found none to be necessary,
noting that "[t]hese facts are well enough known."' 167 With regard to
the second canon, he stated that "[e]ven where the disclosure to the
physician is actually confidential, it would nonetheless be made
though no privilege existed.' 68 Although conceding that the
relationship between physician and patient ought to be fostered as
provided in the third canon, Wigrnore emphatically denied that the
injury to that relationship is greater than the injury to justice by
prohibiting disclosure, stating:
The injury is decidedly in the contrary direction. Indeed,
the facts of litigation today are such that the answer can
hardly be seriously doubted.
The injury to justice by the repression of the facts of
corporal injury and disease is much greater than any injury
which might be done by disclosure. And furthermore, the
few topics-such as venereal disease and abortion-upon
which secrecy might be seriously desired by the patient
come into litigation ordinarily in such issues (as when they
constitute cause for a bill of divorce or a charge of crime)
that for these very facts common sense and common justice

163. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EvIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
2285, at 527 (John T. McNaughton rev., photo. reprint 1981) (1961).
164. Id. § 2380a, at 829-30.
165. Id. at 829.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.

LAW §
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that the desire for secrecy shall not be listened
demand
9
to.

16

Wigmore dismissed the argument that to reject a physicianpatient privilege, while recognizing an attorney-client privilege, was
profession. 170
to favor the legal profession over the medical
Although only grudgingly supportive of an attorney-client privilege,
he noted that "the absence of the privilege would convert the
attorney habitually and inevitably into a mere informer for the
benefit of the opponent, while the physician, being called upon only
rarely to make disclosures, is not consciously affected in his relation
with the patient."''
Wigmore further argued that "[n]inety-nine per cent of the
litigation in which the privilege is invoked consists of three classes
of cases-actions on policies of life insurance where the deceased's
misrepresentations of his health are involved, actions for [personal]
injur[y] .. .and testamentary actions where the testator's mental
capacity is disputed."' 172 In these classes of cases, Wigmore argued
that the need for medical testimony is great and could find no reason
173
in those situations.
for the physician to have to conceal the facts
He concluded his diatribe against the privilege by suggesting that
of
"[t]he real support for the privilege seems to be mainly the weight
' 74
legislature."'
the
upon
pressing
professional medical opinion
Another evidence luminary of the past, Edmund M. Morgan,
expressed similar sentiments. 175 Morgan also argued against a
physician-patient privilege on utilitarian grounds, stating:
Ordinarily a patient does not object to a dignified disclosure
of his physical condition on a proper occasion, unless he is
suffering from a disease ordinarily considered loathsome or
disgraceful. Physicians are usually required to report such a
disease to public authority and thus to make its existence a
matter of public record. Certainly the typical citizen would
169. Id. at 830.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 831.

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.

175. Edmund M. Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert
Testimony by Rules ofEvidence, 10 U. CHI. L. REv. 285 (1942).
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much rather take a chance on having such matter brought
out by the physician in a lawsuit than to endure the certainty
that it would be recorded in a public office open to the eyes
of subordinate clerks and employees, if not to the public.
And this would be doubly true if he knew the truth that in
such a lawsuit he could himself be made a witness and
required to answer all pertinent questions as to his
symptoms, objective and subjective, past and present.
Consequently, the assumption that patients are deterred
from full disclosure by reason of their desires for secrecy in
76
future litigation has little or no basis in reason.'
The classic text on the physician-patient privilege was written
by Clinton DeWitt and published in 1958.177 In that text, the author
purports to set forth a complete exposition of the law involving the
privilege, but he is no advocate for it-at least in its absolute form.
He finds that the "principal reasons advanced in support of the
privilege are not convincing."' 17 8 First, he rejects the notion that a
person will hesitate to confide in a physician unless he has assurance
that his confidences cannot later be revealed. 179 DeWitt notes that
the basic fallacy of the theory is the unwarranted assumption that the
patient knows all about the privilege and its protections.1 80 He adds,
only a relatively small number of patients would shy at
consulting a physician even though they knew that he might
later be required to disclose their state of health or
the nature and effect of their injuries in a court of law. ...
Ordinarily, bodily injuries and disease are attended with
neither humiliation nor disgrace ....181
In exceptional cases, such as those involving venereal disease,
however, the physician may be required by state law to disclose the
82
matter into the public record.1
DeWitt also finds that there is no evidence that the rejection of
the privilege would cause an injury to the physician-patient
relationship that is greater than the injury to the cause of justice. 83
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 290-91.
DEWrrr, supra note 162.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 35.
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He fears such a privilege will suppress relevant and important
evidence. 184 He argues that in the vast majority of reported cases in
which the privilege has been invoked, the primary purpose was to
use the privilege as a procedural device to win a lawsuit rather than
disclosure of
to protect the privacy of the patient or to prevent the
5
patient.18
the
disgrace
or
humiliate
would
matters that
DeWitt notes with approval the trend to require disclosure of
much information that, in the past, might have been protected by the
privilege, such as the requirement of listing the cause of death on
death certificates and the disclosure of venereal disease under some
He concludes by recommending either the
circumstances. 186
abolition of the physician-patient privilege or, if that is not politically
of a qualified privilege such as exists in
feasible, the substitution
87
Carolina.1
North
Other notable scholars of the twentieth century took a position
similar to that expressed by Wigmore, Morgan, and DeWitt. 188 This
seeming unanimity of animosity was undoubtedly a major factor in
the elimination of a general physician-patient privilege in the set of
Federal Rules first proposed in 1969.189 In rejecting the general
privilege, the Advisory Committee noted:
The rules contain no provision for a general physicianpatient privilege. While many states have by statute created
the privilege, the exceptions which have been found
necessary in order to obtain information required by the
public interest or to avoid fraud are90so numerous as to leave
little if any basis for the privilege. 1
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

35-36.
36.
36-37.
39.

188. See, e.g., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., PrivilegedCommunications: Is Justice

Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?,
52 YALE L.J. 607 (1943); W.A. Purrington, An Abused Privilege,6 COLUM. L.
REv. 388 (1906).
189. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text.
190. FED. R. EvID. 504 advisory committee's note (Preliminary Proposed
Draft Mar. 1969), 46 F.R.D. 161, 259 (1969). The Court in Jaffee considered
the inclusion of a psychotherapist-patient privilege in the Proposed Federal
Rules to be a positive factor in its recognition of the privilege under the federal
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2. Scholarship in Favor of a General
Physician-Patient Privilege
Ironically, despite the overwhelming scholarly authority
supporting elimination of a general physician-patient privilege, the
elimination of such a privilege in the proposed rules provoked many
other scholars to leap to its defense. The emphasis among these
writers is the protection that the privilege gives to the privacy of the
individual-the patient-rather than any claim of a beneficial
utilitarian effect as sought by Wigmore and the other pre-Rules
writers.
One of these scholars was Charles L. Black, who pointed to the
Proposed Rules as giving "major aid and comfort to that
diminishment of human privacy which is one of the greater evils of
our time."' 91 He added:
If a man, consulting a heart specialist, reveals in the course
of his case-history interview[] that he has had gonorrhea,
then the cardiologist must divulge this in court, whenever
and wherever any litigant needs the revelation. If a man
under therapy for psychoneurosis reveals that his having
had gonorrhea has filled him with guilt, that communication
is protected. This is preposterous. It is a case of the tail
ceasing to wag the dog, and continuing to wag in place after
the dog has gone away. Psychotherapy is privileged, and
ought to be amply privileged, exactly because it is a kind of
medicine, and a human being ought to be able to consult
any kind of a doctor without by that act, or by the
necessities of communication consequent on that act,
rendering himself vulnerable to being stripped to and below
the skin in public. There is no ground whatever for singling
out psychotherapy for special treatment. Any patient has to
reveal his condition, verbally or otherwise, in order to be
treated effectively. Moreover, for what it is worth, most

common law. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 14-15. Correspondingly, the absence of a
general physician-patient privilege in the proposed rules would likely be a
negative factor in any future decision on the existence of such a federal
common law privilege.
191. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Maritaland PhysicianPrivileges-A Reprint
of a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DuKE L.J. 45, 47 (1975).
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often concern
competent doctors of all sorts very
92
1
conditions.
emotional
themselves with
Other legal writers and practicing lawyers expressed concern
them. 193
considered
Congress
time
the
at
Rules
Proposed
the
over
Some prominent current text writers base their support for the
existence of evidentiary privileges, including a general physicianpatient privilege, upon their impact on personal privacy. For
example, Edward J. Imwinkelried, in his rewrite of the Wigmore
treatise with regard to privileges, agrees with Wigmore insofar as he
believes that the physician-patient privilege fails to meet the
194
He notes "[i]t is
instrumental or utilitarian tests of privilege.
doubtful that the patient needs any additional inducement to speak
freely, especially because in many cases the thought of a lawsuit has
not yet crossed the patient's mind."' 195 Yet, he finds the privilege
supportable on humanistic grounds:
The recognition of the privilege advances the value of
autonomy privacy. Whatever the content of the person's
life plan, physical and mental health aid the person
in pursuing the plan. The patient may require a
psychotherapist's assistance to preserve the patient's
cognitive and volitional ability to formulate the plan. By
the same token, the patient often needs a physician's
assistance to help preserve the person's physical capacity to
carry out the person's life plan. That assistance can entail
counseling the person about even unorthodox types of
medical treatment. The creation of a private enclave for the
physician-patient consultations enables the patient to make
more informed, 96independent choices among his or her
medical options.'
Imwinkelried raises the possibility that there is a constitutional
right to informational privacy in the context of physician-patient
192. Id. at 51.
193. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal
Courts: An Alternative to the ProposedFederal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO.
L.J. 61 (1973); see also supra notes 19-21.
194. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON

§ 6.2.6(A) (2002).
195. Id. at 495 (footnote omitted).
196. Id. at 498-99 (footnotes omitted).
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communications, but admits that such constitutional protection is
sharply disputed. 197 Nevertheless, he argues:
Yet, even if there is no constitutional right to informational
privacy in this area, there is undeniably enhanced
constitutional protection for decisional or autonomy
medical privacy even outside the family realm. Lower
courts have interpreted the Supreme Court precedents as
conferring a measure of constitutional protection on the
independence of certain decisions about medical treatment.
It is unnecessary to argue that medical information is so
intensely private that there is a constitutional right to
informational privacy and that the Constitution compels the
recognition of a privilege. So long as the patient has a
constitutional interest in decisional or autonomy privacythat is, the independence of important medical decisionsthe recognition of a privilege is an appropriate means to the
end of promoting that interest. The creation of a private
enclave for the consultation increases the probability that as
a result of the conference, the patient will make an
98
intelligent, independent choice.'
Imwinkelried balances the various considerations involving the
privilege by citing with approval the North Carolina'99 and
Virginia 200 statutes that provide for qualified rather than absolute
20 1
privileges.
The authors of the Wright and Graham treatise on Federal
Practice and Procedure also articulate their support for a general
physician-patient privilege with an argument different from
Imwinkelried's, but akin to it.202 These authors express concern over
the vulnerability of the patient, rather than on his or her right of
privacy. 203 They note, "exploiting the vulnerability of those who are

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 499-501.
Id. at 500-01 (footnotes omitted).
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §8-53 (LEXIS 2003).
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-399 (LEXIS 2000).
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 194, at 502.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 84-86.
Id.
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disabled from illness or injury is contrary to basic human
values[,] 204 adding:
There are several things to be noted about this version of
the non-instrumental justification for the privilege. First, it
does not depend upon the patient's (self)interest in privacy
nor consult his or her feelings about having the physician
disclose; instead it considers the interests of the rest of us in
the kind 20 5of community we have constructed for
ourselves.
Wright and Graham go on at great length to castigate the
legislatures and the courts for their protection of psychotherapist
communications as distinguished from other communications
for medical purposes. 20 6 They find the singling out of such
communications to be a product of intense lobbying by mental
rather than a recognition of a meaningfully
health professionals
20 7
category.
separate
C. Conclusion
As in most legal debates of substance, there are strengths and
weaknesses in the arguments on each side. Rather than separately
debating each of the points, it is perhaps more useful to look at cases
decided in the federal courts. In doing this, the courts should
determine, first, whether the existence of a physician-patient
privilege would have made a difference either in the outcome of the
case or in the impact of disclosure on the physician-patient
relationship, and, second, whether the protection of the information
from disclosure is justified on policy grounds. Such an analysis is
done in the next section.

204. Id. at 84.

205. Id. at 86 (footnote omitted).
206. Id. at 88-139.
207. Id. at 93-94.
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III. WHAT DIFFERENCE WOULD THE EXISTENCE OF A PHYSICIANPATIENT PRIVILEGE HAVE MADE IN FEDERAL COURT CASES?

A. Cases Beyond the Likely Scope of the Privilegeor Within a WellRecognized Exception

The cases in which the federal courts have refused to find the
existence of a physician-patient privilege include many instances in
which the recognition of the privilege would likely have made no
difference at all. Assuming that a physician-patient privilege would
have the same parameters as the recognized psychotherapist-patient
privilege, the information sought in those cases would either be
within a well-recognized exception to the privilege or outside its
20 8
scope entirely.

Many of the cases in which parties have sought recognition of a
general physician-patient privilege are instances in which the
patient's condition is an element of his claim or defense.20

9

If the

208. The suggested scope of a general physician-patient privilege is
discussed infra Part IV.
209. See, e.g. Boddie v. Cranston, No. 97-3247, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
8742, at *1-2 (6th Cir. May 4, 1999) (involving prisoner's claim for damages
based on exposure to tuberculosis); Mann v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 114 F.3d
1188 (6th Cir. 1997) (sexual harassment claim); Patterson v. Caterpillar, Inc.,
70 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding no privilege where physician did not
testify to confidential communications in claim for disability payments under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)); Sneed v. Jones, 991
F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1993) (involving prisoner's claim for mistreatment that
included allegations of physical abuse and improper medical treatment);
Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1373-74 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding, in a
claim for injuries under § 1983 civil rights action, that even if state physicianpatient privilege law applied, there was a waiver where medical records were
released without claiming privilege); Martin v. Cottrell Contracting Corp., No.
7:00-CV-1 14-F(l), 2000 WL 33177232 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 13, 2000) (involving a
personal injury action in admiralty for an accident on navigable waters);
Hingle v. Bd. of Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, Civ. A. No. 95-0134, 1995 WL
731696, at *1 (E.D. La. Dec. 7, 1995) (involving a slip and fall case with
federal claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA) and ERISA as well as supplemental state claims);
Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of N.C., No. 93-556-CIV-5-F, 1994 WL
660635 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 28, 1994) (involving medical and psychiatric records
for a pre-Jaffee ADA claim); Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 81
Civ.5018(GLG), 1984 WL 833, at *1-4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1984) (claiming
Civil Rights Act and Equal Pay Act violations with pendent state claims for
sexual harassment and holding the records of a gynecologist were properly
discoverable as going to plaintiff's claim for damages).
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psychotherapist-patient, rather than a general physician-patient
privilege had been involved in these cases, the privilege would likely
have been rejected, even under the narrowest view of the exception
for instances in which the patient has put his or her condition in
issue. 210 In these types of cases, Wigmore's prediction of a narrow
of a general physician-patient privilege is clearly
application
2 11
correct.
In other instances, the only information that seems to be
requested is the identity of the patient and billing information,
matters that would not be confidential under the psychotherapist2
In other
patient privilege recognized by the federal courts. 1
instances, the government has sought a patient's information where
the communications concerned the illegal dispensing of drugs-a
the crime-fraud exception
criminal transaction likely to come within
213
privilege.
to the psychotherapist-patient
B. The Special Case of IncidentalDisclosure of
PatientInformation
One category in which a general physician-patient privilege
might arguably apply deserves special mention largely because the
application of the existing psychotherapist-patient privilege is
uncertain in these situations. A party, often the government or a qui
tam plaintiff, may seek a patient's information in connection with an
investigation of charges against a physician or other medical
provider. 214 Some of the information sought would be outside the
purview of any likely privilege. 215 As noted above, mere requests for
a patient's identity or billing information are unlikely to involve
communications of the type protected by the existing
210. See supra notes 81-115and accompanying text.
211. See supra text accompanying note 172-174.
212. See United States v. Moore, 970 F.2d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1992); see also
supra note 62 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 801 F.2d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir.
1986) (upholding grand jury investigation into illegal dispensing of anabolic
steroids and other drugs without a legitimate medical purpose or prescription);

United States v. Witt, 542 F. Supp. 696, 697, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (upholding
an investigation of clinic allegedly distributing Quaaludes). For a discussion

of the crime-fraud exception, see also supra text accompanying notes 116-130.
214. See infra note 225.

215. Id.
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psychotherapist-patient privilege. 216 Often, however, the information
sought is somewhat broader; for example, where the party may seek
diagnosis or drug prescription data. Such information would, at least
indirectly, implicate patient communications and should arguably be
protected by either the presently existing psychotherapist-patient
privilege or, if recognized, a general physician-patient privilege with
the same parameters. Some states adhere to this reasoning and apply
a physician-patient privilege to such records.2 17
Where records involving physical, as opposed to mental,
conditions are involved, the federal courts have followed a consistent
pattern; they reject a common law physician-patient privilege. The
appropriateness of the dissemination of the information is instead
analyzed as a question of the patient's privacy. Most recently, the
issue has been treated as one involving the provisions of the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and
2 18
its implementing regulations.
The defining case dealing with this question is the United States
Supreme Court decision in Whalen v. Roe.2 19 Although the question
in Whalen arose in a slightly different fact pattern from that
described above, the Court's treatment of the issue set the tone
for future lower court decisions dealing with more usual
circumstances. 220 In Whalen, the plaintiff challenged the
constitutionality of a state statute that created a data bank of the
names and addresses of persons obtaining certain drugs by medical
prescriptions. 2 2 1 The Court noted the absence of a common law
physician-patient privilege. 222 However, the Court analyzed the
claims as if they raised a legitimate question as to protecting the
privacy rights of the patients whose data was sought.2 23 The Court

216. See supra notes 62 and 212 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., Henry v. Lewis, 478 N.Y.S.2d 263, 266 (App. Div. 1984); In
re Powell, 746 N.E.2d 274, 276, 278 (Ill. App. 2001).
218. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). For an example of
pertinent regulations under HIPAA, see 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2003).
219. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 591.
222. Id. at 602 n.28.
223. Id. at 602-06.
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upheld the statute, finding that the scheme sufficiently protected the
privacy rights.224
Other pre-HIPAA cases have dealt with the issue in a similar
way by applying privacy considerations to limit, but not prevent,
access to the information. The courts have provided some qualified
protection to the patient but have refrained from labeling that
225
protection a privilege.

The HIPAA regulatory scheme recognizes patients' privacy
interests but contemplates the disclosure of protected health
information in the course of a judicial or administrative
proceeding 226 or for law enforcement purposes. 227 Courts asked to
consider the question have not been hesitant to find that HIPAA does
not codify a general federal physician-patient privilege; nor have
they found a limitation on the disclosure of the information in court
or grand jury proceedings as provided in the act and regulations.228
224. Id. at 603-05.
225. See, e.g., United States v. Burzynski Cancer Research Inst., 819 F.2d
1301, 1304, 1310 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying privacy considerations but not
privilege to the information sought in an action against a doctor for shipment
of non-FDA approved anti-cancer drug); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Dir. of Nat'l
Inst. for Occupational Safety Health, 636 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1980) (recognizing
absence of physician-patient privilege but considering issue of searching
employee records to determine skin disease under Whalen to find sufficient
assurances against public disclosure); United States ex rel. Roberts v. QHG of
Ind., Inc., No. 1:97-CV-174, 1998 WL 1756728 at *1, *8-*9 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 8,
1998) (recognizing that there is no federal physician-patient privilege but
considering questions of patient privacy and limiting identifying information
on records in a qui tam action where plaintiffs sought patient information for
their claim against a physician for holding infant patients in intensive care
longer than necessary in order to increase billings); Wei v. Bodner, 127 F.R.D.
91, 97-98 (D.N.J. 1989) (finding no physician-patient privilege applied in
anti-trust action brought by an anesthesiologist against a hospital and that
privacy interests could be protected by limiting the information sought);
United States v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1027, 1029-32 (E.D. Wis.
1980) (finding no physician-patient privilege and that limitations on the use
and dissemination of the information adequately protects patients' privacy
interests); see also United States v. Perryman, 14 Fed. Appx. 328 (6th
Cir.2001) (refusing to apply physician-patient privilege to preclude admission
of tests showing defendant had tested positive for drugs in a case involving
revocation of a prisoner's supervised release).
226. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2003).
227. Id. § 164.512(f).
228. See United States ex rel. Stewart v. The La. Clinic, No. CIV.A.99-1767,
2002 WL 31819130, at *2-*6 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 2002) (noting the absence of
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2 29
The decision in Northwestern Memorial Hospital v. Ashcrof
illustrates how the federal courts treat this kind of information. In
Northwestern Memorial Hospital, plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003,230
which prohibited certain abortion procedures. 23' The defendant
Department of Justice subpoenaed medical records of patients on
whom a particular physician had performed a type of late-term
abortion. 23 2 The lower court quashed the subpoena based upon its
recognition of a physician-patient privilege that would apply to
medical records dealing with abortions. 2 33
The district court
analogized the abortion decision to communications between
psychotherapists and patients, which were protected in Jaffee, and
found the same need for confidentiality. 2 34
The Court of Appeals affirmed, but on different grounds.23 5 The

higher court flatly rejected the application of a Jaffee-type privilege
for communications involving abortions. 2 36 It also refused to find
that anything in HIPAA or its regulations prevented disclosure of the
a federal physician-patient privilege while interpreting HIPAA regulations); In
re Grand Jury Subpoena, 197 F. Supp. 2d 512, 514-15 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(finding no federal physician-patient privilege and that HIPAA regulations do
not protect patient's privacy interests in the face of a legitimate law
enforcement inquiry).
229. 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004).
230. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. 2004).
231. Id.
232. Northwestern Mem '7Hosp., 362 F.3d at 924.
233. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, No. 04 C 55, 2004 WL 292,079, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2004).
234. Id. at *6. After noting the Court's recognition of the need for
confidentiality in communications between psychotherapists and patients in
Jaffee, the district court stated:
It can be no less when dealing with a woman, her doctor, and the
necessity to make a decision on abortion, issues indisputably of the
most sensitive stripe. American history discloses that the abortion
decision is one of the most controversial decisions in modem life, with
opprobrium ready to be visited by many upon the woman who so
decides and the doctor who engages in the medical procedure. An
emotionally charged decision will be rendered more so if the
confidential medical records are released to the public, however
redacted, for use in public litigation in which the patient is not even a
party. Patients would rightly view such disclosure as a significant
intrusion on their privacy.
235. Northwestern Mem "lHosp., 362 F.3d at 933.
236. Id. at 926.
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237

Nevertheless, the court upheld the lower court's quashing
records.
of the government's subpoena based upon the hospital's appropriate
invocation of the privacy rights of its patient and upon proof that the
burden of compliance outweighed the benefit of production. 238 The
court found that the government's need for these records in this
litigation was slight when weighed against the women's privacy
interests, which would be compromised even if the identity of the
women were redacted from the records. 239 The court found that the
government had failed to adequately articulate a use for the sought
records. 240 In effect, the court recognized a qualified privilege for
these medical records and held that the defendant had not met its
burden in overcoming that privilege. 24 1 Such a qualified privilege is,
of course, very different from the one announced in Jaffee.
The issues involved in cases such as Northwestern Memorial
Hospital can, of course, arise in the context of communications
involving mental, as well as physical, ailments. Such a situation is
different because of the clear recognition of the psychotherapistpatient privilege in Jaffee.242 The courts' treatment of the situation,
however, is not likely to be materially different from the way the
matter is treated in cases involving information regarding purely
physical ailments. An example of such comparable treatment is the
case of A Helping Hand, L.L.C. v. Baltimore County.24 3 In Helping
Hand, the plaintiffs alleged violations, inter alia, of the Americans
with Disabilities Act244 in connection with the location of a
methadone treatment clinic for heroin addicts. 24 5 They sought a
protective order to prevent discovery of medical information
24
pertaining to clinic patients. 246 The court held, however, that

237. Id. at 925-26. The court held that the HIPAA regulations do not
impose state evidentiary privileges, including the Illinois medical records
privilege, on suits to enforce federal law such as the action involved in the
Northwestern MemorialHospital case.

238. Id. at 927-33.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 930.
241. Id. at 933.
242. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
243. 295 F. Supp. 2d 585 (D. Md. 2003).

244. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000, Supp. 2001).
245. Helping Hand,295 F. Supp. 2d at 587.
246. Id.
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the information was not protected under HIPAA. 247 Although
recognizing the existence of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the
court held that the plaintiff had given no indication that it was
entitled to claim that privilege and had therefore not met its burden
of establishing its applicability. 248 Nevertheless, the court recognized
the sensitivity of the information to recovering heroin addicts, and
therefore found that the defendants had not shown sufficient
need for
249
the information that justified access to the information.
Boudreau ex rel. Boudreau v. Ryan 250 is another example of
courts using a balancing process rather than an absolute privilege
where incidental use of patient records is involved. In Boudreau, the
plaintiffs brought an action on behalf of developmentally and
mentally disabled adults who were allegedly eligible to receive
Medicaid services but who had not received such services. 251 The
plaintiffs sought documents from various agencies, including the
252
The court
mental health records of various non-party persons.
refused to apply the psychotherapist-patient privilege, finding that
there had been no showing that the records contained confidential
communications. 253 The court then permitted some production of the
documents finding that the plaintiffs had a legitimate need for the
documents in rebutting one of the defendants' claims. 254 Production
was issued pursuant to a protective order specifying that "'no
documents shall be produced that contain personally identifiable data
of a developmentally disabled person seeking [M]edicaid
services."255
The Helping Hand and Boudreau cases are indicative of the
courts' reluctance to find the existence of a psychotherapist-patient
privilege in cases involving the indirect use of medical records,
whether they involve physical or mental illness and where there is no
showing that the records reflect patient communications. Although
courts give some protection, there is no absolute privilege. Thus,
247. Id. at 592.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 592-93.
250. No. 00 C 5392, 2001 WL 1001156 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2001).
251. Id. at*l.
252. Id. at 1-2.
253. Id. at *3-4.
254. Id. at *4-5.
255. Id. at *5 (quoting the plaintiffs' proposed protective order).
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even if a general physician-patient privilege were recognized, a court
could still hold it inapplicable where all that is sought are general
medical records of patients involved only incidentally in the case. A
general physician-patient privilege would need to have different
parameters than the existing psychotherapist-patient
privilege in
256
order to clearly bring such situations into its ambit.
C. Instances in Which the Existence of a GeneralPhysician-Patient
PrivilegeMight Have Made a Difference
In some instances, refusal to recognize the existence of a general
physician-patient
privilege
has
occurred
when
similar
communications to a psychotherapist would have been protected. If
actual communications are involved, the policies closely track those
involved in the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Two cases involving direct communications between patient and
physician in which the existence of an extended privilege might have
made a difference are United States v. Donley257 and United States v.
Bercier.258 In Donley, the court makes only a passing reference to its
rejection of a general physician-patient privilege. 259 Defendant had
sought to prevent admission of statements he had made to the
physician treating him for a self-inflicted gunshot wound.26 °
Assuming that the statements did not go to the defendant's mental
condition where it is raised as a defense, a court would seem to be
bound to protect these same statements under Jaffee as if they had
been made to a psychiatrist treating the defendant after his attempted
suicide. 261 It seems as likely that defendant/patients would seek the
confidence of their treating physicians as they would of their
psychiatrists under the same circumstances. As long as the statement
may be pertinent to diagnosis or treatment, the same considerations
should apply whether the defendant/patient sought physical or
psychological treatment. 2 62 It is perhaps easier to see the pertinence
256. See infra Part II for a discussion of the wisdom of such an extension.
257. 878 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1989).

258. 848 F.2d 917 (8th Cir. 1988).
259. Donley, 878 F.2d at 737, n. 1.
260. Id.
261. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 1.

262. Presumably, the patient's communication must be pertinent to treatment
under the existing psychotherapist-patient privilege. The Court in Jaffee held
that "confidential communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her
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of the patient's statements in the context of psychotherapy. The
medical literature, however, makes clear that a full disclosure of the
patient's "underlying feelings, goals, and expectations" is important
in all physician-patient interactions. 263 Arguably the policy of
encouraging interaction in the medical setting applies if the statement
may bear to some extent on the patient's treatment.
In Bercier, the defendant was prosecuted for involuntary
manslaughter after he drove a motor vehicle while intoxicated.264 A
key contested issue in the case was whether the defendant was in fact
the driver of the vehicle. 265 The defendant objected to the
introduction of statements he had made to the emergency room
physician after the accident "admit[ting] that he had been driving and
had hit the steering wheel with his chest." 266 The defendant claimed
that admission of the statements into evidence violated his physicianpatient privilege, but the court rejected the application of a privilege
to the statements at issue. 267 The same statements made to a
psychotherapist would have been protected under Jaffee since a
general description of the cause of the accident may well have been
268
pertinent to treatment.
A number of other cases demonstrate how the existence of a
general physician-patient privilege would have made a difference,
provided that the records in fact reflected communications rather
than simply objective information. One such case is Gilbreath v.
Guadalupe Hospital Foundation,Inc.,269 which arose from a claim
brought by the plaintiff for improper dismissal from his federal

patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment" are privileged. 518 U.S. at 15.

One basis for excluding a statement from the privilege was where the

communication sought regarded a request unrelated to the patient's counseling
for alcoholism, but was rather for the address of a detoxification center. This
was not a confidential communication. United States v. Schwensow, 151 F.3d
650,657-58.
263. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
264. Bercier,848 F.2d at 918.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 920.
267. Id.
268. The pertinence of general statements of causation to medical treatment
is recognized in the hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment. FED. R. EviD. 803(4).
269. 5 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 1993).
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job. 270 The dismissal was based in large part on an incident in which
the plaintiff was charged with shooting his wife and son.2 7 1 In the
course of the federal agency hearing of the plaintiffs claim, the
plaintiffs employer sought the medical records relating to the
treatment of the wife and son.2 72 The court upheld enforcement of
the subpoena requiring production of the records finding, inter alia,
273
no physician-patient privilege protection under federal law.
Assuming that the records reflected communications between the
patients and their physicians, similar records with regard to their
psychiatric treatment would have been privileged under Jaffee.
2 74 are even closer to
The facts in Fisher v. City of Cincinnati
those in Jaffee. In Jaffee, the Court found that the psychotherapistpatient privilege absolutely protected communications between a
police officer and her psychotherapist concerning the shooting death
that was the subject of the plaintiffs section 1983 action. 275 In
Fisher,the plaintiff brought a section 1983 action against the city for
deadly injuries sustained in an automobile collision with an off-duty
police officer.276 He sought medical records from the officer's
treatment after the collision, particularly the results of a bloodalcohol test.2 77 The court held that no privilege protected this
information. 27 Again, assuming that the medical records in Fisher
contained communications between the police officer and his
physician, there would seem to be little to distinguish the case from
the police officer in Jaffee-other than the now crucial difference
that the communications involved physical rather than mental topics.
IV. DO THE POLICIES EXPRESSED IN JAFFEESUGGEST THE EXTENSION
OF THE PRIVILEGE TO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN A PATIENT AND
PHYSICIANS GENERALLY?

The above cases demonstrate that the existence of a general
privilege for communications to physicians, like that extended to
270. Id. at 787.
271. Id.

272. Id. at 787-88.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id. at 791.
753 F. Supp. 692 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18.
753 F. Supp. at 692.
Id.
Id. at 694-95.
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communications with psychotherapists under Jaffee, would make a
difference in the outcome. Does that mean that the psychotherapistpatient privilege should be extended to general physician-patient
communications? The policies expressed in Jaffee that support the
psychotherapist-patient privilege justify an extension of the privilege,
but with the limitations that federal courts have read into the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.
The psychotherapist-patient privilege has been limited to actual
communications between the patient and the therapist in the course
of diagnosis or treatment or to notes directly reflecting such
communications. 79 Even though psychotherapy is involved, where
the information sought involves objective patient information rather
than communications from the patient, the courts have tended to treat
the matter as one of privacy and have balanced the need for the
information against the patient's interests instead of applying the
absolute privilege announced in Jaffee.2 80 If the same parameters
were to apply to medical records generally, the results in such cases
should be the same.
There should be no absolute physician-patient privilege in these
instances, but instead a qualified protection of the patient's
confidentiality. In cases in which patient records are relevant only in
the course of an investigation of a physician, any disclosure is
indirect, making the chilling effect of potential disclosure more
remote. Patient privacy is implicated, and thus the concerns raised
by Imwinkelried 28 1 and Wright and Graham 282 are present, but those
considerations can be accounted for without applying an absolute
privilege. Such an absolute privilege might well limit the disclosure
of valuable information in the judicial process without a concomitant
benefit to the patient. The treatment of the issue by the courts under
the present state of the law seems to appropriately focus on those
privacy concerns.283 Access to the records is limited both in the
nature of the information and in its dissemination based on such
concerns. 2 84 Similarly, Congress and the federal regulators have
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

For a discussion of the limitations, see infra Parts I.C-I.H.
See supra text accompanying notes 243-255.
See supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 202-207 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.B.
Id.
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spoken on the issue and have provided some protection through the
HIPAA regulatory scheme, leaving to the courts considerable room
for disclosure as necessary to the judicial process.285 Such a result is
consistent with the policies expressed in Jaffee, where the concern
was for confidentiality of communications. 286 The courts may elect,
based upon the policies of HIPAA, to give more protection than is
now commonly given, but the protection should be less than
absolute.
Even where the patient is directly involved in the litigation, the
same considerations apply where only the results of tests or similar
objective information is sought. Even though the patient's interest is
involved, the policy that suggests a qualified rather than an absolute
privilege is the same. For example, in Fisherv. City of Cincinnati,287
the court could have found that the policies of Jaffee were not
implicated if the request for medical records was limited to bloodalcohol test results rather than the patient's communications with her
physician concerning that test. The party's privacy rights are not
implicated to the same extent as they would be if the substance of his
communications were sought. The results of objective tests in cases
like Gilbreath v. GuadalupeHosp. Found. Inc.288 should be treated
the same-under qualified but not absolute protection.
But where the information sought involves communications
between doctor and patient, whether for treatment of physical or
mental infirmities, the absolute privilege should apply. Jaffee
involved the disclosure of the actual communications of the patient
to her psychotherapist. 289 Allowing such disclosure might have had
a chilling effect on the patient's willingness to communicate fully.
That same chilling effect may well result from disclosure of
information relevant to physical illness also. Medical scholars and
clinicians emphasize that treatment of physical illness should involve
290
more than physical examination and diagnostic tests.
In cases like United States v. Donley and United States v.
285. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2003).

286. 518 U.S. at 15; see also supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
287. 753 F. Supp. 692 (S.D. Ohio 1990). See text accompanying supra note

262.
288. 5 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 1993). See supranote 269 and accompanying text.
289. 518 U.S. at 15.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 155-156.
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Bercier, the policies behind the recognition of an absolute privilege
seem to be the same as those articulated in Jaffee.29 1 For example,
Jaffee involved statements made by a police officer to a social
worker acting as a psychotherapist. 292 Assume that the same
statements were made to the officer's physician trying to figure out
whether stress was causing her back pain. The same need for a full
explanation of the stress, including its cause and severity, would
exist. Physical ailments may have psychological as well as physical
causes. The patient would be reluctant to make that full disclosure if
she felt it could be disclosed by the physician in the course of
litigation, and there would be a real policy need for absolute
confidentiality to protect the privacy of that physician-patient
conversation. That it was a general practitioner or orthopedic
surgeon looking at a physical ailment, rather than a psychotherapist
seeking to treat a mental illness, should make no difference. Courts
should consider whether there is any less reason to encourage and
protect the confidentiality of such communications than there is in
the case of communications to a psychotherapist.
The Court in Jaffee emphasized that "[e]ffective psychotherapy... depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in
which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure
of facts, emotions, memories, and fears." 293 The medical literature
strongly supports the notion that the physician seeking to deal with
294
physical ailments depends upon the same atmosphere.
V. CONCLUSION

The medical privilege in the federal courts should apply to
communications to general physicians as well as psychotherapists.
Despite the Court's dicta to the contrary, the policies articulated in
Jaffee would be well served by such an extension of the privilege
provided it is limited in scope to the same parameters as the existing
psychotherapist-patient privilege. The existing privilege is absolute
in the areas in which it operates. Different protections of a
more qualified kind apply where something other than direct
291. 878 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1989); see supra note 257-268 and
accompanying text.
292. 518 U.S. at 3-4.
293. 518 U.S. at 10; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 155-156.
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communications between medical provider and patient is involved.
But communications should have the same absolute privilege
whether medical attention is sought for the patient's ego or her
elbow.
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